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Delivering informed consent: Montgomery, patient autonomy and 
realistic medicine  
 
Dr Judy Laing* 
Reader in Law, University of Bristol 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper will examine some aspects and potential implications of the Supreme Court decision 
in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board.1 In doing so, it will briefly chart the shift in the 
development of the standard of care for doctors in the context of the duty to disclose 
information about the risks of treatment, culminating in Montgomery in 2015. The case 
involved a claim against an obstetrician for inadequate disclosure of the risks of a natural birth. 
There were complications during the delivery and her baby son, who was starved of oxygen, 
was born with cerebral palsy. The claimant suffered from diabetes and was small in stature, 
and argued that she would have opted for a caesarean section had she been fully informed of 
the risks of a natural birth. The Supreme Court found in favour of the claimant and the decision 
reinforced the central role of patient autonomy, and the requirement for doctors to focus on the 
needs of the ‘particular patient’ when discussing potential treatment options. There are 
however some difficulties with this approach (as discussed below) and the courts still hold the 
trump card as final arbiters.   This model undoubtedly challenges the traditional dominance 
model of the medical profession, associated with the work of medical sociologist Eliot 
Freidson, by giving the ultimate power to determine appropriate ‘professional’ standards and 
skills to the court.  
 
In the wake of the decision, some branches of the profession, for example the Royal College 
of Surgeons (RCS) and the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI), 
                                                     
* I am extremely grateful to Catherine Kelly, Colm McGrath. Ken Oliphant and Oliver Quick for their 
insightful and constructive comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to the participants at the 
‘Professional Negligence in the 21st Century’ seminar, University of Bristol, 17th January 2017 for their 
questions and helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any errors/omissions remain my 
own.  
1 [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430. 
 2 
have expressed concerns about its implications and issued revised guidance on the consent 
procedures prior to surgery2 and anaesthesia3. These are traditionally areas of clinical practice 
where procedures carry high risks for patients. Whilst the judgment is undoubtedly long-
awaited and welcome for patients and patient rights groups, the medical profession has 
naturally been concerned about its implications for their clinical practice and therapeutic 
relationships. The decision comes at a time when the NHS is under increasing pressure. The 
Red Cross has recently described the health care system in the UK as a ‘humanitarian crisis’4 
and NHS finances have been described by The King’s Fund as ‘almost at breaking point’.5 The 
King’s Fund identified that between 2010 and 2015, health spending has fallen far below the 
annual growth rate of previous years and will not cover the increasing demand.6 The healthcare 
system in the UK is undoubtedly facing the greatest financial pressure in decades and this 
undoubtedly has consequences for those working in the system as well as for patient care.7 
 
The paper will explore the impact of Montgomery on the medical profession in the context of 
the broader challenges in the health care system, focusing on the potential consequences for 
medical education and on the job training and delegation, as well as for clinical practice in 
certain branches of medicine, notably for practitioners working in general practice and high-
risk specialisms, such as surgery and anaesthesia. It concludes with some thoughts on what the 
decision means for medical professionalism and seeks to contribute to current debates about 
what it means to be a ‘good doctor’ working in the NHS - a service under acute strain - in the 
twenty first century.  
 
A brief look at the development of the duty to disclose  
 
                                                     
2 RCS, Consent: Supported Decision-Making – a good practice guide (2016) located at 
https://www.rcseng.ac.uk/library-and-publications/college-publications/docs/consent-good-practice-
guide/. 
3 AAGBI: Consent for anaesthesia 2017 (January 2017) located at 
https://www.aagbi.org/sites/default/files/AAGBI_Consent_for_anaesthesia_2017_0.pdf  
4 See ‘NHS faces ‘humanitarian crisis’ as demand rises, British Red Cross warns’, The Guardian, 6 
January 2017 located at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jan/06/nhs-faces-humanitarian-
crisis-rising-demand-british-red-cross. 
5 The King’s Fund, Six ways in which NHS financial pressures can affect patient care (31 March 2016), 
available at https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/six-ways.   
6 Understanding NHS financial pressures (March 2017) located at 
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/understanding-nhs-financial-pressures. 
7 Ibid.  
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Much ink has been spilled over the last half a century charting the development of the duty of 
care in the context of the doctor-patient relationship. From its early beginnings in the infamous 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee decision in 1957,8 to the more recent 
articulation in Montgomery v Lanarkshire, judges have grappled with the appropriate standard 
to be set. As Stanton’s work over the years has demonstrated in determining the appropriate 
conditions for liability in negligence, the courts are driven by a number of factors and required 
to balance competing interests.9 In the context of clinical negligence, there is inevitably tension 
between protecting the legitimate interests of the profession by preserving their autonomy and 
expertise; whilst at the same time protecting the interests of patients – in particular a patient’s 
dignity, her right to determine what happens to her body and her ability to give informed 
consent. More generally in the context of negligence claims against public bodies/authorities, 
courts are also mindful of the resource implications of imposing liability, and may also consider 
factors such as the risk of defensive practices and wastefulness of finite resources.10 
 
As Miola11 has outlined, there are three potential models that could be followed for establishing 
the standard of care in risk disclosure. It could be judged from the perspective of the objective 
‘reasonable’ professional; the ‘reasonable’ patient or more subjectively focused on the 
individual patient. In the former, the question of the appropriate level of disclosure is 
determined by reference to the reasonable doctor – the professional standard or what has 
commonly been referred to as medical paternalism. Whereas the latter two are patient-centred 
standards – and what the patient reasonably should or wants to know. The subjective approach 
would (at least in theory) promote the greatest respect for patient autonomy.  
 
The swing of the pendulum between these approaches is evident in the development of the case 
law during the last five decades. The Bolam test in clinical negligence set the standard of care 
according to the professional medical standard, which means that a doctor was not negligent if 
                                                     
8 (1957) 1 WLR 582. 
9 See for example KM Stanton, ‘Professional negligence: duty of care methodology in the twenty first 
century’ (2006) 22 PN 134; KM Stanton, ‘Decision-making in the tort of negligence in the House of 
Lords’ (2007) 15 Tort L Rev 93; KM Stanton ‘The neighbour principle in the 21st century: Yesterday’s 
revolution’ (2012) 20 Tort L Rev 61.  
10 See for example Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; Smith v Chief Constable of 
Sussex Police [2009] 1 AC 225; and D v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust [2005] 2 AC 373; and 
A v Essex CC [2004] 1 FLR 749 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 749-751 where these factors have 
prevented the imposition of a duty of care on the police, health care practitioners and social workers. 
11 J Miola, ‘On the Materiality of Risk: Paper Tigers and Panaceas’ (2009) 17 Med L Rev 76. 
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she acted in accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion. In the words of McNair 
J: 
 
‘A man need not possess the highest expert skill at the risk of being found negligent .. 
it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising 
that particular art’ and ‘he is not negligent if he has acted in accordance with a practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art’.12  
 
This was interpreted in subsequent cases to mean that a doctor was not negligent, if she 
conformed to commonly accepted professional practice. The courts were prepared to accede to 
the expertise of the medical profession, as the reasonableness of the care fell to be determined 
by the standards set by the profession.  As Lord Scarman stated in Maynard v West Midlands 
RHA,13 ‘the law imposes a duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter for medical 
judgment’. This Bolam standard was extended beyond clinical diagnosis and treatment to the 
extent to which doctors must inform patients of the risks of a proposed treatment. In Sidaway 
v Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital,14 the majority felt that complaints about inadequate 
risk disclosure should be subjected to the Bolam test – so the patient is entitled to know what 
the doctor thinks she should know.15  Although even then, there were some differences of 
opinion among the judges and a strong opposing judgment from Lord Scarman, who was a lone 
voice in advocating a more prudent-patient approach.16 
 
This approach to the standard of care was borne out of ‘a long tradition of highly paternalistic 
medicine’17 during a period when the medical profession was in the ascendancy.  Notions of 
medical professionalism at that time were very much rooted in autonomy, dominance and self-
regulation, in line with the influential work of the medical sociologist, Freidson.18 According 
                                                     
12 (1957) 1 WLR 582 at 586. 
13 [1984] 1 WLR 684 at [639]. 
14 [1985] AC 871.  
15 This approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Blyth v Bloomsbury HA [1993] 4 Med LR 
151 and Gold v Haringey HA [1987] 2 All ER 88. 
16 See M Brazier, ‘Patient autonomy and consent to treatment: the role of law’ (1987) 7 LS 169. 
17 R Schwartz and A Grubb, ‘Why Britain Can’t Afford Informed Consent’ (1985) 15(4) Hastings 
Center Report 19, 22. 
18 E Freidson, Professionalism: The Third Logic (London: Polity Press, 2001). It is recognised that 
Freidson provides only one account of professionalisation and the power relationship between doctor 
and patient. Alternative explanations have also been advanced (see for example the work of M R Haug, 
DeProfessionalisation: an alternative hypothesis for the future' in P Halmos, Ed, The Sociological 
Review Monograph 20: Professionalisation and Social Change (1973 University of Keele) 195-211; or 
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to Freidson, the fundamental criterion that distinguishes a profession from other occupations 
is its autonomy – which is not absolute but depends on the tolerance and protection of the 
state.19 This autonomy and freedom from external control rests on three claims: 
 
• There is such an unusual degree of skill and knowledge involved in professional work 
that non-professionals are not equipped to evaluate it; 
• Professionals are responsible and may be trusted to work without supervision; and 
• The profession can be relied on to deal itself with members who behave incompetently 
or unethically (ie self-regulation). 
 
According to his thesis, professionalism exists:  
 
‘when an organized occupation gains the power to determine who is qualified to 
perform the defined set of tasks, to prevent all other from performing that work, and to 
control the criteria by which to evaluate performance’.20   
 
The social context of medicine throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s was very much orientated 
towards the profession holding all the cards – as Quick has described, both at the ‘macro’ 
(profession) and ‘micro’ (individual) level of decision-making.21 The Bolam standard of 
regulating medical care conforms to this paradigm, as it enables the medical profession to 
control performance criteria and standards. This deference to medical opinion demonstrated by 
McNair J in Bolam was very much in tune with societal and political perceptions of doctors 
and the elevated and privileged status of the medical profession in society, as Schwartz and 
Grubb highlighted in 1985: 
                                                     
more recently W M Sullivan's work emphasising 'mutual trust': 'Medicine under threat: professionalism 
and professional identity' (2000) 162(5) Canadian Medical Association Journal 673-675. For an 
account of these various perspectives see M Saks, Defining a Profession: The Role of Knowledge and 
Expertise (2012) 2(1) Professions and Professionalism 1-10. The decision in Montgomery draws 
strongly on Freidson's binary model of the doctor/patient relationship as a power dynamic and is the 
paradigm against which the critique inherent in the judgment is set. Accordingly, this article works from 
within that framework to analyse the effects of the judgment and its likely impact on medical practice. 
19 E Freidson, Profession of Medicine, A Study in the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1970). 
21 O Quick, Regulating Patient Safety: The End of Professional Dominance (Cambridge: CUP, 2017) 
ch. 1 (‘The Rise and Fall of Professional Dominance’). 
21 O Quick, Regulating Patient Safety: The End of Professional Dominance (Cambridge: CUP, 2017) 
ch. 1 (‘The Rise and Fall of Professional Dominance’). 
 6 
‘As the proceedings in Sidaway indicate, the legal profession defers to its medical 
counterparts as a part of the tacit agreement to respect the traditional distribution of 
social power.’ 22 
This view continued unchallenged for some time. However, with the passage of time, cracks 
began to appear in the Bolamite philosophy and the professional dominance model was 
subjected to considerable challenge. The medical profession’s dominance has diminished 
greatly over the last two to three decades. The cracks appeared during a time of great social 
and legal flux, and during a period of unprecedented change to the organisation and delivery 
of health care in the UK. As Quick has outlined,23 consumerism and managerialism have found 
their way into the NHS and impacted on the delivery of health care and the work of health care 
professions. Indeed, Lords Kerr and Reid in Montgomery recognised that patients have now 
become consumers of health care: 
 
‘[Patients] are also widely treated as consumers exercising choices: a viewpoint which 
has underpinned some of the developments in the provision of healthcare services’.24  
 
Writing at the turn of the century, Lord Woolf (then Lord Chief Justice) charted this shift from 
excessive judicial deference of ‘Doctor Knows Best’ in Bolam to a more contemporary and 
critical approach.25  Echoing Grubb and Schwartz, Lord Woolf suggests that the judiciary were 
reluctant to make findings of negligence ‘against members of any honourable profession’.  
However, several social and legal changes precipitated the change in judicial attitudes, notably, 
the highly publicised scandals—the Bristol heart surgery scandal and the crimes committed by 
GP Harold Shipman—which cast doubt on the beneficence of the profession and dented public 
trust and confidence.  This was accompanied by an increasing awareness of patient rights with 
the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998; and the growth in the scale of litigation,26 as well 
as influence from other jurisdictions. This led to a gradual change in approach and judicial 
                                                     
22 Schwartz and Grubb (n 17) p. 22. 
23 Quick (n 21)  
24 Montgomery (n 1) at [75] 
25 Lord Woolf, ‘Are the courts excessively deferential to the medical profession?’ (2001) 9 Med L Rev 
1. 
26 For example, the NHS Litigation Authority suggests that the number and value of clinical negligence 
continues to rise each year. The amount of damages paid to patients in the NHS has risen by 23%  to 
950.4 million in 2015/16 from the previous year (See NHS Litigation Authority, Annual report and 
accounts 2015/16 Resolve and learn (London: HMSO, 2016),  
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attitudes (as outlined below), culminating in the Supreme Court decision in Montgomery which 
has re-calibrated the doctor-patient relationship and subjects the profession to increasing 
external scrutiny.  
 
The first signs of the judicial shift appeared in Bolitho v City and Hackney HA,27 a case 
involving potentially negligent treatment in which, for the first time, the court adopted a more 
critical approach to the Bolam test. Lord Browne-Wilkinson sought to limit the reach of Bolam 
and make it clear that it is the court’s role to set the standard of care in negligence, not the 
medical profession. He stated:28 
 
‘[a] doctor escapes liability for negligent treatment or diagnosis just because he leads 
evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of the opinion that the 
defendant’s treatment accorded with sound medical practice.’ 
 
The court noted that the medical opinion must be reasonable/responsible, which means that it 
must be ‘capable of withstanding logical analysis’. Lord Woolf believed (and hoped at the time 
of writing in 2001) that the courts would take this ‘injunction to review the logical basis of 
expert testimony seriously’.29  
 
In the context of the doctor’s duty to disclose, the first indications that they had came in Penney 
v East Kent HA30 and Marriott v West Midlands HA,31 closely followed by Pearce v United 
Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust,32  where Lord Woolf MR endorsed a prudent-patient standard 
of disclosure:  
 
‘…if there is a significant risk that would affect the judgment of a reasonable patient, 
then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the patient of that 
significant risk, if the information is needed so that the patient can determine for him 
or herself as to what course he or she should adopt’.33 
                                                     
27 [1998] AC 232. 
28 At 241.  
29 Woolf (n 25) p. 10. 
30 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 41. 
31 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep Med 23. 
32 [1998] EWCA Civ 865. 
33 At **. 
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Both Wyatt v Curtis34 and Chester v Afshar35 subsequently confirmed this more patient-centred 
approach. 
 
This shift has impacted significantly on the medical profession and notions of medical 
professionalism. It has challenged the profession’s traditional hegemony and subjected it to 
increasing external scrutiny. As Lord Woolf opined, this is both necessary and desirable, as:  
 
‘it is unwise to place any profession or other body providing services to the public on 
a pedestal where their actions cannot be subject to close scrutiny. The greater the power 
the body has, the more important is this need’.36  
 
These words suggest that, in addition to compensating injured patients for negligently inflicted 
harm, the court’s role is to exercise a ‘restraining influence,’37and curb the excessive or 
inappropriate use of power, including professional power in these cases. However, in doing so, 
it must get the balance right. That means ensuring that sufficient weight is given to the 
competing interests in determining the scope and standard of the duty of care. Some might ask 
whether the Supreme Court judges did get that balance right in Montgomery and overlooked 
the interests of the profession.38  This article seeks to contribute to that debate and move beyond 
the merits of the individual decision, by focusing on some of the broader challenges and 
potential implications that it could have for the medical profession in the current challenging 
NHS climate.  
                                                     
34 [2003] EWCA Civ 1779 at [16]: ‘Lord Woolf’s formulation refines Lord Bridge’s test by recognising 
that what is substantial and what is grave are questions on which the doctor’s and patient’s perception 
may differ, and in relation to which the doctor must therefore have regard to what may be the patient’s 
perception’ per Sedley LJ. 
35 [2004] UKHL 41 at [16]: ‘In modern law medical paternalism no longer rules and a patient has a 
prima facie right to be informed by a surgeon of a small, but well established, risk of serious injury as 
a result of surgery’ per Lord Steyn. Note however that the approach adopted by the House of Lords to 
the issue of causation in this case has been the subject of some controversy and academic critique (see 
for example J Stapleton, Occam’s razor reveals an orthodox basis for Chester v Afshar (2006) 122 (Jul) 
Law Quarterly Review 426–448). 
36 Woolf (n 25) p. 15. 
37 Ibid.  
38 The judgment is not without its critics, see for example J Montgomery and E Montgomery, 
Montgomery on informed consent: an inexpert decision? (2016) 42(2) Journal of Medical Ethics 89-
94. 
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Montgomery: Risk disclosure and the ‘particular patient’ 
 
The decision in Montgomery was long-awaited and heralded by some as the final nail in 
Sidaway’s coffin.39 In many respects however, the decision has simply confirmed the direction 
of travel which was already evident in several earlier decisions of the lower courts.40  
 
Briefly, the facts of the case involved Nadine Montgomery who was pregnant, small in stature 
and suffered from diabetes. Thus, there was a risk (9-10%) that her baby would suffer shoulder 
dystocia (where the baby’s shoulder gets stuck in delivery) if she gave birth to him naturally. 
The doctor responsible for her care did not advise her of this risk, nor that the alternative of 
birth by caesarean section was available, which did not carry the same  risk of dystocia 
(although the procedure did have other risks). Mrs Montgomery elected to give birth naturally 
and her child was born with cerebral palsy due to complications associated with shoulder 
dystocia. She stated in her evidence that, had she been informed of the risk of shoulder dystocia, 
she would have opted for an elective C-section. This evidence was accepted by the defendant 
in the case. 
 
The Scottish Court of Session had followed the traditional paternalistic approach as applied in 
Sidaway, and found in favour of the defendants. However, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
decision was overturned. The defendants were found to be in breach of their duty of care by 
not warning of the risks of shoulder dystocia and not being advised of the option of a caesarean 
section delivery to Mrs Montgomery prior to her labour.41  
 
                                                     
39 R Heywood, ‘RIP Sidaway: Patient-Oriented Disclosure – A Standard worth waiting for?’ (2015) 23 
Med L Rev 455. 
40 A-M Farrell and M Brazier, ‘Not so new directions in the law of consent? Examining Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board’ (2016) 47 Journal of Medical Ethics 85; C Foster, The last word on consent? 
(2 April 2015) New Law Journal located at https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/last-word-
consent. Notably Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust and the support for patient autonomy 
in Chester v Afshar. 
41 Note that there were initially two negligence arguments– one relating to negligent treatment (i.e. the 
decision not to perform the c-section) and the negligence claim in not informing the patient of that 
option. The Supreme Court only considered the second point.  
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The Supreme Court reviewed the long line of authorities in Bolam, Sidaway, Pearce, Chester 
v Afshar. They noted that in Sidaway, several different approaches had been taken by the Law 
Lords and concluded that: 
 
‘..the analysis of the law by the majority in Sidaway was unsatisfactory in so far as it 
treated the doctor’s duty to advise her patient of the risks of proposed treatment as 
falling within the scope of the Bolam test.’42 
 
In Montgomery, emphasis was placed on the notion of patient autonomy.43 The appropriate 
legal test was considered and is now established that a doctor is: 
 
‘under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material 
risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or 
variant treatments’.  
 
The test of materiality of a particular risk is: 
 
‘…whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position would be likely to attached significance to the risk, or the doctor 
is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach 
significance to it’ (emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, the court emphasised that: 
 
‘…the assessment of whether a risk is material cannot be reduced to percentages. The 
significance of a given risk is likely to reflect a variety of factors besides it magnitude: 
for example, the nature of the risk, the effect which its occurrence would have upon the 
life of the patient, the importance to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by 
                                                     
42 At [87]. 
43 It is recognised in the context of the risk disclosure cases that the court’s use of this concept has been 
contested. As Coggon and Miola have argued, the judicial approach to autonomy has focused on who 
makes the decision and ignored the importance of understanding, thereby confusing autonomy with the 
concept of liberty – see J Coggon and J Miola, ‘Autonomy, Liberty, and Medical Decision-Making’ 
[2011] CLJ 523, 523. An examination of how the concept of autonomy is employed by the court in 
Montgomery is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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the treatment, the alternatives available, and the risks involved in those alternatives. 
The assessment is therefore fact-sensitive, and sensitive also to the characteristics of 
the patient’.44 
 
So, the starting point in identifying the doctor’s duty should be the needs, concerns and 
circumstances of the individual patient. The approach is therefore potentially much more 
subjective and based on the individual characteristics of the particular patient. 
 
The Supreme Court also made it clear that the doctor’s role is ‘advisory’, and should involve 
‘dialogue’ – to enable the patient to make an informed decision. This means providing 
information in a comprehensible manner and ‘not bombarding the patient with technical 
information which she cannot reasonably be expected to grasp’.45 
 
Finally, the court recognised that there may be exceptions to the doctor’s duty to disclose 
material risks – if they reasonably considered that it would be ‘seriously detrimental to the 
patient’s health’ ie the so-called therapeutic privilege or exception.46 However, the court noted 
that it should not be abused and would be very limited.47 No guidance was provided by the 
court on the scope of this exception, and this lack of clarity is problematic for the profession 
as it creates ambiguity and uncertainty. As the RCS’ revised guidance on consent has 
recognised: it ‘presents significant legal difficulties for doctors’.48 Whilst the appropriate 
standard of disclosure is now focused primarily on the individual patient, the retention of the 
reasonable patient standard and the therapeutic exception reminds us that the ultimate arbiter 
is the court: ‘Responsibility for determining the nature and extent of a person’s rights rests with 
the courts, not with the medical profession’.49   
 
Patients Rule, OK? 
 
                                                     
44 At [89]. 
45 At [90]. 
46 For further discussion of this exception and other aspects of the judgment see Heywood (n 39); Farrell 
and Brazier (n 40).  
47 At [91]. 
48 Royal College of Surgeons (n 6) p 13. 
49 At [83]. 
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In a paper reviewing the developments of the duty to disclose ‘down under’, Miola found that 
‘the ethical imperative on the part of the doctor… is to communicate with the patient rather 
than just list the risks inherent in the treatment’.50  The key focus must be on partnership, 
dialogue and prioritising communication between the doctor and patient. Miola concluded that 
the preferred model is New Zealand’s Code of Patients’ Rights, which focuses on the subjective 
needs of the particular patient and provides a right to effective communication. In line with 
this, and the ‘supreme status’ that autonomy has attained in health care law and ethics more 
generally, Montgomery has recognised the need to respect the patient’s right to make an 
autonomous decision. It also mandates the type of subjective approach advocated in New 
Zealand, and directs the doctor to work in partnership with the individual patient by engaging 
with and focusing on her wishes, views and values.51 It moves towards a process of shared 
decision making,52 as doctors must find out what is important to patients in their conversations 
about proposed treatment options. This approach will help to guide and limit the options for 
discussion, so they are tailored to the patient’s preferences. The case directs doctors to be 
guided by the patient and his/her values, not their own – that means taking time to find out 
about the patient and their lifestyle, hobbies and interests and tailor the information to the 
patient’s needs.53   
 
For example, the RCS guidance suggests that the risk of loss of sensation in the hand following 
by-pass surgery may be minor risk to one patient compared to the benefit of increased life 
expectancy, but it could be a very important risk to another and therefore material, eg a pianist 
or other skilled workers who rely heavily on their hands to practice their skill, such as 
carpenters, electricians or plumbers. Similarly, the AAGBI updated advice54 includes the 
example of a professional singer undergoing anaesthesia who would obviously need 
information about the potential risk of damage to her vocal chords. The focus on patient values 
                                                     
50 Miola (n 11) p 105. 
51 Coggon and Miola (n 43); See also J Miola, Autonomy Rued OK? (2006) 14 Med L Rev 108; S 
Devaney, Autonomy Rules OK (2005) 13 Med L Rev 102. 
52 See M A Durand et al, Can shared decision-making reduce medical malpractice litigation? A 
systematic review (2015) 15 BMC Health Serv Res 167 for an interesting review of the available 
evidence on the impact of shared decision-making on patient’s intentions to initiate litigation. The 
review concluded that the current evidence is inconclusive and further investigation is required.  
53 Royal College of Surgeons (n 6) p 13. In the wake of Webster (a child) v Burton Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 62 that includes finding out about any previous treatment decisions 
as well as the patient’s educational background – both of which were deemed to be material factors by 
the court. 
 
54 S M Yentis et al, ‘AAGBI: Consent for anaesthesia 2017’ (2017) 72 Anaesthesia 93. 
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is key, as it recognises that people can make what others might regard as ‘bad’ choices. It will 
now be essential for clinicians to carefully document their discussions and the dialogue that 
takes place with individual patients as part of the process of gaining informed consent.  
 
The judgment is undoubtedly in line with some of the changes that have been taking place more 
broadly in the health care system during the last decade—specifically the move towards 
patient-centred care and a more open and honest culture within the NHS. The Francis Inquiry 
in 2013 into the failures of care in Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust had found that 
hundreds of patients had suffered unnecessarily due to an insidious, negative and highly 
paternalistic culture. The Inquiry made numerous recommendations aimed at fostering ‘a 
common culture shared by all in the service of putting the patients first’. 55  In its wake, the 
government has been implementing several key reforms to promote a more compassionate and 
transparent NHS. The changes have included the introduction of the duty of candour ie a legal 
duty on healthcare providers to inform and apologise to patients if there have been mistakes in 
their care leading to harm. Montgomery has therefore created a much closer symmetry between 
the legal duties owed to patients both before and after care. 
 
This type of patient specific approach, based on patient preferences, can have several benefits 
for practitioners and patients, as research by the Kings Fund demonstrates.56  The review found 
that treatment that does not accord with the patient’s wishes can be wasteful, particularly in 
relation to complex and uncomfortable treatments at the end of life. Also, patients tend to make 
different choices when they are provided with more information about the potential 
benefits/risks. For example, the report cites a systematic review that included 11 trials of major 
elective surgeries. The review found that demand fell by 20% after patients were better 
informed.57 Whilst the longer-term impact on health outcomes of this type of shared decision 
making are not yet fully known, there is some evidence to suggest that it can improve patient 
satisfaction with outcomes and their relationship with professionals; improved adherence and 
                                                     
55 Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (February 2013) HC 947.  
56 A Mulley et al, Patients’ Preferences Matter: Stop the silent misdiagnosis (The Kings Fund, 2012), 
available at https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/field/field_publication_file/patients-
preferences-matter-may-2012.pdf 
57 Ibid. p. 11; See D Stacey et al, Decision aids for people facing health treatment or screening decisions 
(April 2017) 5 Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 11. 
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an enhanced ability for self-management.58  These benefits could lead to some efficiency 
savings in the NHS. 
 
Montgomery accords with this approach as it requires open communication and dialogue 
between the doctor and patient, thereby encouraging a process of shared decision-making based 
on patient preferences. It is also in line with GMC professional guidance on consent, which has 
set the bar at the height of partnership and patient-centred disclosure for some time. As the 
Supreme Court recognised in Montgomery: ‘the guidance issued by the GMC has long required 
a broadly similar approach.’59 The guidance was published in 2008 and provides that:  
‘The doctor explains the options to the patient, setting out the potential benefits, risks, 
burdens, and side effects of each option, including the option to have no treatment. The 
doctor may recommend a particular option which they believe to be best for the patient, 
but they must not put pressure on the patient to accept their advice. The patient weighs 
up the potential benefits, risks and burdens of the various options as well as any non- 
clinical issues that are relevant to them. The patient decides whether to accept any of 
the options and, if so, which one’.60  
There is however a caveat to this subjective approach. Whilst the focus is very much on the 
particular patient and the professional guidance promotes the same approach, Montgomery 
retains references to the reasonable patient and the notion of therapeutic privilege (even though 
it was not applicable in the case itself). This does not signal a return to Bolam, as it refers to 
the reasonable patient and not the prudent doctor. Patients may have been empowered by the 
decision, however, where there is any doubt, the judges are still the ultimate arbiters on the 
appropriate standard. In that sense, the court still holds the trump card and the legal profession 
retains the balance over the distribution of professional power.61  This is evident from some of 
the case law that has flowed from the courts since Montgomery in 2015. There had been 
concerns that Montgomery would open the floodgates and lead to a huge increase in claims for 
                                                     
58 R Drake et al, ‘Shared decision making in mental health: prospects for personalized medicine’ (2009) 
11 Dialogues Clin Neurosci 455; See also Realistic Medicine, Chief Medical Officer’s Annual Report 
2014-15 (2015) p 17, available at http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0049/00492520.pdf 
59 At [93]. 
60 Consent; patients and doctors making decisions together (June 2008) pp 9-10. Located at 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/consent_guidance_index.asp 
61 For an interesting account of the professional power dynamics between the medical and legal 
professions, see Petr Skrabanek’s critique of the professional elite in The Death of Humane Medicine 
and the rise of Coercive Healthism (Social Affairs Unit, 1994). 
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negligent information disclosure, but the case law reveals that has not necessarily been the 
case. The Court of Appeal in Webster (A Child) v Burton Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust62 
followed Montgomery and concluded (on similar facts) that the consultant should have 
informed the patient of recent (albeit incomplete) research showing the increased risks of 
delaying labour. However, judges in the lower courts have been more circumspect.63  For 
example, in A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust the judge rejected a 
claim that a pregnant woman should have been warned that the small size of her baby might 
be due to a chromosomal disorder, since any risk of such abnormality was negligible/ 
theoretical. Dingemans J stated: 
‘In my judgment the decision in Montgomery confirms the importance of patient 
autonomy, the proper practice set out in the GMC Guidance, and the proper approach 
set out in Pearce and Wyatt. It is not authority for the proposition that medical 
practitioners need warn about risks which are theoretical and not material.’64  
Furthermore, in other clinical negligence claims, the judges have been equally cautious. For 
example, the High Court in Muller v Kings College Hospital65 reinforced the approach in 
Bolitho leading the court to question the medical judgment in the context of a missed diagnosis 
of a malignant melanoma. And in Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust66 the claimant 
had sustained a head injury following an assault and was taken to hospital. He spoke to the 
receptionist and left after 19 minutes without being seen by a clinician. His condition 
deteriorated at home and he returned to hospital by ambulance later that evening, having 
suffered and extradural haematoma requiring surgery. The claimant alleged that there were 
                                                     
62 [2017] EWCA Civ 62. 
63 See for example other unsuccessful claims in Tasmin v Barts Health NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 3135 
(QB) where the court concluded that a risk of 1:1000 is ‘immaterial’  for the purposes of Montgomery; 
Grimstone v Epsom & St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 2756 (QB); Holdsworth 
v Luton & Dunstable University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 3347; Clark (AP) v 
Greater Glasgow Health Board [2016] Scots CSOH 24; and Surrey v Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals 
NHS Trust [2016] EWHC 1598 (QB)  - in a claim involving costs payable by the claimant in clinical 
negligence litigation to the defendant, the judge said at [95]: ‘I do consider, with respect, that each 
Costs judge placed too much weight on the suggested analogy with the informed consent issue in the 
context of medical treatment.’ 
64 [2015] EWHC 1038. 
65 [2017] EWHC 128 (QB). 
66 [2017] EWCA Civ 151. 
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breaches of duty by both clinical and non-clinical staff. However, the Court of Appeal 
disagreed, finding that the Trust did not have a duty of care to provide accurate waiting times 
to patients attending Accident and Emergency. Applying Caparo v Dickman,67 it would not be 
fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on a receptionist not to give misleading 
information about waiting times – ‘[t]his would add a new layer of responsibility to clerical 
staff and a new head of liability for NHS health trusts’ as ‘it is not their function or their duty 
[of clinical staff] to give any wider advice or information to patients’ (at [53] and [51]). The 
court was sympathetic to the floodgates argument and concerned about the wider ramifications 
to the health care system, when 450,000 people per week present to the reception staff in A&E 
departments across the country.  The decision clearly places limits on the expansion of duties 
that are placed on health care providers. It also implicitly recognises that an autonomy-focused 
Montgomery approach has consequences for patients as well as health care providers and 
practitioners.68 Adults with capacity, such as Mr Darnley, must take responsibility for the 
consequences of the decisions they make and be prepared to accept any risks that flow from 
those decisions.  In this case, the patient decided to leave the hospital without receiving medical 
advice after a very short time, which led to a significant deterioration in his physical health 
necessitating significant medical intervention.  
 
Implications for medical practice and professionalism  
 
Montgomery has generally been well received among the legal community as representing a 
victory for patients as it reflects a more personalised approach to the delivery of health care 
and treatment.69  However, it may also come at some cost to the medical profession.  There has 
been a marked shift away from the traditional model, but has the pendulum now swung too far 
the other way?  More specifically, what are the consequences of the decision for the workforce 
in terms of their morale, workloads and practice, medical education and training? And what 
might that signify for our understanding of modern medical professionalism? These aspects of 
the decision are explored in the sections below.  
                                                     
67 [1990] 2 AC 605. 
68 See for example commentary on the case at http://www.pibriefupdate.com/content/pibulj-sec/3368-
duty-of-care-hospital-not-liable-for-non-clinical-staff-giving-incorrect-a-e-waiting-time-andrew-
cousins-dwf and https://nigelpooleqc.blogspot.co.uk. 
69 See for example R Bagshaw, ‘Modernising the doctor’s duty to disclose risks of treatment’ (2016) 
132 LQR 182-186; M Campbell, ‘Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board’ (2015) 44 Common Law 
World Review 222; Farrell and Brazier (n 40) 8; Heywood (n 39); C Hobson, ‘No (,) more Bolam please: 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board’ (2016) 79 MLR 468-503.  
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• Professional Morale and Workforce Pressures 
 
Clinicians have already expressed concerns that the judgment may impact negatively on their 
(already high) workloads and increase the amount of time they must spend with patients, as 
well as the added bureaucracy and administrative burdens it may create. Moreover, this comes 
at a time when the NHS is already under severe strain, and there are significant workforce and 
consequent workload pressures. These are particularly acute in general practice, mental health 
and also for frontline staff and junior doctors working in Accident & Emergency and other 
hospital departments.70   The revised RCS guidance to surgeons for example recognises that 
the judgment  requires a ‘change in attitude from surgeons’ as they are no longer the sole arbiter 
of determining what risks are material to their patients.71 The guidance also cautions that ‘the 
time and workload pressures facing clinical teams pose significant challenges in providing the 
right level of support to patients throughout the consent process’.72 Clinicians have also been 
worried about the likelihood of increased litigation in the wake of the decision and what can 
be done to minimize the risks.73 The RCS guidance directs surgeons to take time to get to know 
the patient well enough to understand their values, wishes and life priorities. The guidance 
contains practical advice on how surgeons can optimise the time available with patients, 
including sending information to the patient in advance to allow him/her sufficient time to read 
and digest it. A pro-forma /decision aid can be used to guide discussions and will be a helpful 
tool.  Written information can also be provided but it is not in itself sufficient and will not 
necessarily be tailored to the individual patient. The use of patient decision aids facilitates 
appropriate conversations and dialogue,74 although they do have their limitations and there is 
a danger that they could come to be regarded purely as a mechanistic tick box approach and 
thus not sufficiently patient specific. Though of course, the patients must not feel bombarded 
                                                     
70 See for example National Health Executive, ‘Critical pressures in NHS workforce put Five Year 
Forward View in danger (29 April 2015) located at http://www.nationalhealthexecutive.com/Health-
Care-News/five-year-forward-view-in-danger-due-to-critical-pressures-in-nhs-workforce;  
71 p. 3. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See the GMC blog located at http://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h1481/rapid-responses (accessed 
27 March 2017) and Royal College of Surgeons, ‘Surgeons warn NHS failing to implement consent 
rules, risks facing increase in litigation pay-outs’ (27 October 2016) located at  
https://www.rcseng.ac.uk/news-and-events/media-centre/press-releases/surgeons-warn-nhs-failing-to-
implement-patient-consent-rules/ (accessed 27 March 2017) 
 
74 R Drake et al (n 58). 
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by too much information and it must be provided in a comprehensible format—which means 
calibrating it to the individual patient. Consent is viewed as a process of shared decision 
making—the discussion may take place over more than one session, especially in complex or 
life changing treatment decisions.   
 
This revised approach will inevitably impact on the amount of time that clinicians are expected 
to spend with patients discussing the treatment options as well carefully documenting those 
discussions in the form of maintaining a written decision-making record. The RCS guidance 
acknowledges that ‘[t]he reality facing surgeons in current practice is that time pressures can 
leave little opportunity to discuss at length the diagnoses or available treatment options’.75 
Nevertheless, it recognises that complying with Montgomery ‘may well involve setting aside 
more time for the discussion about consent to treatment’ thereby adding to existing workloads. 
Surgeons are encouraged to speak to their medical directors about this.76  
 
As we know only too well, the medical profession is already feeling the pressure working in 
the NHS, which is at’ breaking point’.77 This has resulted in a state of unease and dissatisfaction 
in the health care professions which cannot be ignored. The GMC recently noted in ‘The state 
of medical education and practice in the UK 2016’78 that many doctors are feeling the pressure 
and need to be supported at all levels. The work environment has become increasingly 
challenging—there has been a period of considerable upheaval in health sector, growing 
pressures on the NHS and a long dispute over contracts with junior staff in the NHS. A growing 
number of patients are living with complex needs and the growing ageing population is putting 
increasing strain on NHS services and staff. The GMC concluded that the level of 
dissatisfaction among doctors seems to be higher than ever before—indeed, the NHS is ‘under 
the greatest pressure in generations’.  
 
                                                     
75 RCS (n 6) p. 18. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See for example research by The King’s Fund, Understanding pressures in general practice (2016) 
available at www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/ pressures-in-general-practice; The King’s Fund, How 
serious are the pressures in social care (2015), available at www.kingsfund.org.uk/projects/ 
verdict/how-serious-are-pressures-social-care; The King’s Fund, Mental health under pressure (2015), 
available at www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/mental-health-under-pressure. 
78 GMC, The state of medical education and practice in the UK 2016 (2016) pp. ii-iii, available at 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/SOMEP_2016_Full_Report_Lo_Res.pdf_68139324.pdf. 
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Levels of satisfaction reported by doctors now suggest that professional morale is of a different 
order. A BMA survey in 2014 found that just one in five doctors who joined the BMA online 
research panel was satisfied with their career.79 While the 2015 GP Worklife survey found that 
GPs job satisfaction was the lowest  and their stress levels highest since the surveys began in 
2001.80 Nurses are also feeling the strain—a survey by the RCN found that nurses feel 
unsupported, undervalued and under pressure.81 The pressure has a negative impact on the 
environment for education and training—the amount of time dedicated to on the job training is 
inevitably suffering.82  The profession is also angry and frustrated by the challenging working 
conditions—as witnessed with the recent junior doctor dispute and industrial action over 
contractual arrangements. And of course, we cannot forget the psychological impact that the 
threat or fear of litigation may have on health care staff.83 The depth of unease cannot be 
underestimated and this has a negative impact on professional morale and staff retention, 
which, in turn, impacts negatively on patient care. Indeed, research in the UK and the US has 
demonstrated that psychological stress, anxiety and depression among clinicians can impact 
negatively on patient care. A US study of 123 residents in three paediatric programmes found 
                                                     
79 British Medical Association, Morale decline: work- force survey shows plummeting satisfaction 
(2016) available at http://www.bma.org.uk/ news-views-analysis/news/2014/december/morale- 
decline-workforce-survey-shows-plummeting-satisfaction.  
80 J Gibson et al, Eighth National GP Work- life Survey (2015), available at http://www.population-
health. manchester.ac.uk/healtheconomics/research/Reports/ 
EighthNationalGPWorklifeSurveyreport/EighthNation alGPWorklifeSurveyreport.pdf.  
81 Royal College of Nursing (2015) ‘Nursing morale has “dropped through the floor” – RCN research’ 
available at https://www.rcn.org.uk/nursingcounts/news/nursing- morale-has-dropped-through-the-
floor-rcn-research. See also the annual NHS Staff Survey in 2016 which suggests that, every year since 
2012, almost 40% of staff responding to the survey felt unwell due to work related stress in the previous 
12 months and less than two thirds of staff reported feeling able to deliver the care they aspire to (located 
at http://www.nhsstaffsurveys.com/Caches/Files/20170306_ST16_National%20Briefing_v6.0.pdf). 
82 The GMC national training survey in 2016 revealed that over a third of postgraduate training 
supervisors were not always able to use the time allocated to them as a medical educator specifically 
for training. 14% reported that there were not always enough staff in their Trust or health board to make 
sure patients are treated by someone with an appropriate level of clinical experience. These findings 
not only reinforce the conclusion that education and training are being affected by service pressures, it 
also suggests that some doctors in training are being asked to perform beyond their level of training.  
(General Medical Council, National training survey (2016), available at http://www.gmc-
uk.org/education/surveys.asp). 
83 See for example G van Dijk, Should Physicians be Afraid of Tort Claims? Reviewing the Empirical 
Evidence (2015) 6 JETL 282; K Turner at al, The impact of complications and errors on surgeons (2016) 
RCS Bulletin 404-407; AW Wu, Medical error: the second victim (2000) 320 BMJ 726. 
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that depressed residents made significantly more medical errors than their non-depressed 
peers.84 The working conditions of healthcare providers and overwork contribute substantively 
to this problem.85 Maben’s research in the UK had similar findings in a mixed methods study 
of nurses’ experiences of working with elderly patients in acute hospital care.86 The study 
concluded that focus and investment in staff wellbeing is essential for the consistent delivery 
of high quality care for older people in acute settings. 
 
As the GMC report concludes – ‘To value staff is to value patients’ and: 
‘The link between staff and patient satisfaction is strong and has been long established 
… the vital importance of active involvement and shared objectives between 
institutions and professionals, not just for professional wellbeing but critically for the 
delivery of safe, compassionate care …The welcome growth of transparency and the 
decline in patient deference, together with the changing relationship with other 
professions, have for many changed the way medicine is practised.’87  
These changes to the way medicine is practiced are challenging and mean that clinicians must 
utilize and develop approaches that optimise the time spent with patients to ensure that 
meaningful dialogue takes place within the time constraints. As the Chief Medical Officer for 
Scotland has suggested in her Annual Report for 2015/16, it is important to make information 
available in a variety of formats and platforms, which can be tailored to the needs of particular 
patients. Doctors should make greater use of electronic communication for example, which 
may be especially helpful to respond to the needs of the ‘i-generation and generations of the 
future’. As she points out: 
‘The availability of electronic communication provides other opportunities to enhance 
understanding and shared decision-making. Recording consultations and producing 
presentations on handheld devices are good examples that are being developed by a 
                                                     
84 A Fahrenkopf et al, ‘Rates  of medication errors among depressed and burnt out residents: prospective 
cohort study’ (2008) 336 BMJ 488;  
85 See for example I C McManus et al, ‘A levels and intelligence as predictors of medical careers in UK 
doctors: 20 year prospective study’ (2003) 327 BMJ 139; R J Kirby et al, ‘Development of the 
Approaches to Work and Workplace Climate Questionnaires for Physicians’ (2003) 26 Evaluation and 
the Health Professions 104. 
86 J Maben et al, ‘“Poppets and Parcels”: the links between staff experience of work and acutely ill older 
peoples’ experience of hospital care’ (2012) 7 International Journal of Older People Nursing 83.  
87 GMC (n 78) p. vi. 
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variety of clinical groups. Both enhance the personalization of care as well as 
information sharing’. 88 
It is imperative that clinicians are provided with appropriate support structures, including tools 
and training to facilitate this process. NHS Trusts/employers must allow sufficient time for 
consent to be gained during consultations and professional bodies have a crucial role to play to 
assist doctors to streamline the process and ensure that it does not become too cumbersome 
and time consuming. Otherwise there is a real danger that the profession will feel increasingly 
pressurised by these additional demands, which, in turn, will further reduce staff morale. And 
that will inevitably impact negatively on the delivery and quality of patient care, which is not 
what the judges in Montgomery intended. 
• A ‘one size fits all’ approach 
 
The disclosure duty requires doctors to provide information about ‘reasonable alternative or 
variant treatments’ including their respective risks. The bar for the knowledge required of 
doctors about the range of treatment options would therefore seem to be set quite high.  
Moreover, Montgomery makes it clear that this duty is universal in nature. Informed consent 
operates in the same way for all doctors/patients, irrespective of the branch of medicine or 
specialism practised. All patients are owed the same standard of individual and patient-centred 
care. 
 
However, this notion of alternatives may be problematic for certain areas of medical practice, 
especially for GPs and other practitioners working in primary care medicine. As Whitaker has 
pointed out, their relationship with patients is different to that of a specialist, such as a surgeon 
or anaesthetist working in secondary care environments.89 It may not lend itself as easily to the 
Montgomery model of risk disclosure as a GP’s knowledge of the range of alternatives may 
not be as thorough or detailed as one would expect of a specialist who performs a small range 
of (albeit high risk) procedures on a more frequent basis:  
 
                                                     
88 Realising Realistic Medicine (February 2017) pp 32-33; located at 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00514513.pdf 
89 P Whitaker, ‘How one tragic case changed the laws about medical consent for us all’ (2015) New 
Statesman 28 May.  
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‘Operations represent discrete activities: they have readily measurable rates of success; 
and potential complications are usually well defined’.90 
 
As advised by the RCS,91 letters from surgical consultants usually outline all this information 
in detail, and is normally sent well in advance to patients. In contrast, most treatments 
prescribed by GPs tend to be pharmacological in nature and patients may be prescribed several 
medications over long periods of time. Psychiatrists in particular face these challenges and 
need direct access to detailed information which may be too complex or voluminous to 
remember.92 Whilst the British National Formulary (BNF) is regarded as the ‘bible’ for 
physicians and does list side effects, it is not comprehensive, nor does it contain important 
information about the success rates of particular drugs.93 There are also concerns that recent 
changes to the BNF have made it more difficult to navigate and use effectively.94 As Whitaker 
concludes, pharmacological information for patients should be accompanied by comparative 
details about the full range of alternatives, such as ‘dietary change, regular exercise or 
psychological intervention’.95  
 
Physicians may be concerned that they do not currently have access to the full range of 
information or tools to enable them to discharge the standard of duty that Montgomery would 
seem to require.96   Moreover, whilst GPs may have more time (in theory) to get to know 
patients, build trust, confidence and dialogue, the realities of modern medicine and patient 
expectations suggest otherwise. A Kings Fund survey of pressures in general practice found 
that GPs reported patient unwillingness to self-manage minor or self-limiting illness and 
widespread expectation among patients of a rapid resolution to problems, as this quote from 
one of the GPs in the study demonstrates: ‘Many expect all their problems to be solved within 
a single appointment alongside unrealistic demands regarding 
referrals/investigations/treatments etc’.97 
 
                                                     
90 Ibid.  
91 RCS (n 6) p. 12.  
92 Drake et al (n 58). 
93 Ibid. 
94 See A Bellerby and DS Needham, Using the British National Formulary effectively (2016) 31 
Nursing Standard 56. 
95 Whitaker (n 86). 
96 Ibid.  
97 The King’s Fund, Understanding the pressures in general practice (May 2016) p. 27. 
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The use of NICE guidelines and evidence based practice (EBP), which is promoted in the NHS, 
could facilitate the informed consent process. EBP ‘is an approach to health care wherein health 
professionals use the best evidence possible ie the most appropriate information available, to 
make clinical decisions for individual patients’.98 Guidelines and knowledge gained through 
research can be used to inform clinical choices. The recent post-Montgomery case of Webster 
(A Child) v Burton Hospitals NHS Foundation has reaffirmed that clinicians are now expected 
to make themselves aware of and pass on information about ‘emerging and recent research’ to 
patients, even if that research is ‘incomplete’.99 But patients and practitioners need timely and 
comprehensive access to research findings and databases to achieve this. A systematic review 
by The Kings Fund100 highlighted that doctors need this type of help to diagnose patient 
preferences. They need better information as well as access to it, and patients need to have 
better information too. Current information systems in the NHS may not necessarily be able to 
effectively deliver the standard of information that Montgomery necessitates.101 Research has 
found significant variations in perception and implementation of EBP among different 
professional groups. 102  Furthermore, research into the uptake and usefulness of NICE 
guidelines suggests that there are some doubts and mixed impact in practice, especially in UK 
mental health services for example.103 There may also be too much information available at 
times for practitioners to assimilate and it can also be very difficult for busy clinicians to find 
                                                     
98 KA McKibbon, Evidence based practice (1998) 86 Bull Med Libr Assoc 396, 397, available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC226388/pdf/mlab00092-0108.pdf  
99 [2017] EWCA Civ 62 at [40]. 
100 A Mulley et al (n 56) pp. 31 et seq 
101 For example, a study into the implementation of NHS information and technology programme in 
England suggests that implementation has been hampered and progress has been poor. Staff lacked 
confidence in new IT systems which hindered their ability to access information in a timely and 
effective manner. See J Hendy et al, ‘Implementing the NHS information technology programme: 
qualitative study of progress in acute trusts’ (2007) 334 BMJ 1360. 
102 Y Weng et al, Implementation of evidence-based practice across medical, nursing, pharmacological 
and allied healthcare professionals: a questionnaire survey in nationwide hospital settings (2013) 
Implementation Science, 24 September, available at 
https://implementationscience.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1748-5908-8-112. 
103 See for example A Court, ‘They’re NICE and neat, but are they useful?: a grounded theory of clinical 
psychologists’ beliefs about, and use of NICE guidelines’ (D ClinPsych Thesis, Canterbury Christ 
Church University 2014), available at http://create.canterbury.ac.uk/12832/; Evaluation and Review of 
NICE Implementation evidence (ERNIE) located at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/content/20061031160205/http://nice.org.uk/usingguidance/
evaluationandreviewofniceimplementationevidenceernie/evaluation_and_review_of_nice_implementa
tion_evidence_ernie.jsp; PD Mankiewicz and C Turner , ‘Do Assertive Outreach clients with 
experiences of psychosis receive the NICE recommended cognitive-behavioural interventions? An 
audit’ (2012) 240 Clinical Psychology Forum 32. 
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enough time to keep abreast of all the new research, drugs and range of treatments. As research 
by The King’s Fund has found, 30-40% of care is not based on available evidence, largely due 
to the difficulties faced by clinicians in keeping abreast with the increasing volume of 
guidance.104 Indeed, the current complexity of treatments and outcomes in modern medicine 
present a fundamental dilemma, as very few medical treatments involve a ‘best choice’. 
 
Moreover, shared decision making is not necessarily just about the mechanics of the process. 
The Supreme Court in Montgomery recognised the inherent power imbalance in the 
doctor/patient relationship, but there are other external dynamics at play, such as the 
environment or circumstances in which that dialogue takes place. For instance, research into 
shared decision making has highlighted that the design and layout of the doctor’s consulting 
room can also impact on the dynamics of the relationship and quality of informed consent.105 
Thus, offices should be configured and furnished in a way that puts patients at ease, facilitates 
communication and enables patients to be active participants in the process.  
 
The challenges are especially acute for primary care practitioners in the current NHS 
environment. Evidence suggests that patient contact with GPs and primary care services 
accounts for 90% of all patient interactions with the NHS.106 But GPs are increasingly feeling 
the pressure as there has been a marked increase in workload at a time of underinvestment and 
a shortage of GPs.107 The GMC’s report into the state of medical education pinpointed general 
practice as a key area for concern. And a recent study in the British Journal of General Practice 
found that lack of time with patients has compromised the ability to practice more patient-
centred care, and with it, GPs sense of professional autonomy and values, resulting in 
diminished job satisfaction.108 The additional pressures of increased patient demand left many 
feeling unsupported and vulnerable to burn out and ill-health, and ultimately, to the decision to 
leave general practice. The study concluded that the pace of administrative change needs to be 
                                                     
104 A Mulley et al n 56 . 
105 R Drake et al (n 58) 
106 Source http://content.digital.nhs.uk/primary-care. See also The patients association, Primary Care 
Review (2012) located at https://www.patients-association.org.uk/our_work/campaigns/primary-care-
review/. 
107 See also ‘Life of a GP: We are crumbling under the pressures of workload’, The Guardian, 8 March 
2015; ‘NHS has the west’s most stressed GPs, survey reveals’, The Guardian, 19 January 2016 (just 
under 6 in 10 GPs in Britain (59%) find their work stressful. Researchers surveyed 11,547 GPs in 11 
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108 N Doran, ‘Lost to the NHS: a mixed methods study of why GPs leave practice early in England’ 
(2016) British Journal of General Practice; 7 January.  
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minimised and the time spent by GPs on the work that is not face-to-face patient care 
reduced.109 Mental health care is another example of a service under increasing strain where 
demand far outstrips capacity. Workforce capacity in psychiatry has been identified as one of 
the key challenges in implementing new standards to achieve parity of esteem for mental health 
care.110 The Commission on Acute Adult Psychiatric Care noted that high case-loads have 
impacted on staff morale with insufficient time to treat patients with empathy and patience.111 
And a BMA report into safe working highlighted that staff shortages have led to dangerously 
high case-loads and physicians are routinely being forced to carry out complex consultations 
in 10 minutes or under, which can leave patients at risk in many ways.112   
 
These organisational and economic realities do not feature heavily in the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in Montgomery. The court’s aim was undoubtedly to do justice between the 
parties and the overriding need was to ensure that the patient’s right to information about 
treatment options was given legal force. The court openly recognised the impact of 
consumerism for patients and the imbalance in the doctor/patient relationship, but only briefly 
alluded to the time pressures faced by GPs. 113 It  did not explicitly recognise the impact of 
consumerism on clinicians working in the NHS over the last 20 years and the very real 
challenges they face in trying to make patient centred care a reality.114 This is unfortunate, as 
noted above, the correlation between workforce well-being, job satisfaction, and the quality of 
patient care has been well documented. One would hope therefore that some of these external 
                                                     
109 See also The King’s Fund, Understanding pressures in general practice (May 2016). 
110 See for example The King’s Fund, Mental health under pressure (London, 2015). 
111 Improving acute inpatient psychiatric care for adults in England (London, 2015), available at 
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constraints would be relevant in the future to determine what amounts to reasonable 
alternatives and variant treatments.  
  
• Medical Education, Experience and Delegation  
 
There is a further point which stems from Montgomery that could have additional ramifications 
for future medical education and training. Implicit in the approach taken by the judges to the 
duty to disclose, is the need for experienced doctors to take responsibility for engaging in 
discussions about risks with patients. For example, the RCS guidance stresses that: 
 
‘.. the discussion about options lies with the surgeon responsible for the patient’s care, 
or if this is not practical, with an experienced member of the surgical team who has the 
time and skill to gain sufficient understanding of the patient’s views and wishes. The 
surgeon discussing treatment with the patient should be suitably trained and qualified 
to provide the treatment in question and have sufficient knowledge of the associated 
risks and complications as well as any alternative treatments available for the patient’s 
condition’.115  
 
The AAGBI guidance similarly refers to the need for consent to be obtained by suitably trained 
and qualified staff with adequate knowledge of the treatment and full range of risks.116  Some 
clinicians feel that this approach will hugely prolong the time taken to obtain consent for a 
given procedure, as it ‘makes it imperative for the doctor performing the procedure to obtain 
consent him/herself and not to delegate this responsibility to a more junior member of the team 
which is presently common practice in many units’.117 This causes problems for effective 
training of junior staff – most of which happens on the job and through direct contact and 
interactions with patients. As the AAGBI guidance recognises — ‘most learning and 
maintaining of practical skills occurs during patients’ care’.118 And it undoubtedly places limits 
                                                     
115 RCS (n 6) p. 15; IC Paterson, ‘Consent to Treatment: Somebody Moved the Goalposts’ (1994) 6 
Clin Oncology 181. 
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on the degree to which delegating the informed consent process is now permissible and/or 
acceptable.  
 
There is also some tension here as, on the one hand, the importance of seeking consent from 
appropriately qualified and experienced staff is borne out by research conducted with junior 
doctors and patients. In a study based on questionnaires in the late 1990s, 37 per cent of the 
junior doctors questioned admitted to obtaining consent for procedures of which they had little 
understanding; the majority of both junior doctors and patients felt that the surgeon performing 
surgery should sign the consent form. The study concluded that junior doctors cannot be 
expected to obtain informed consent for procedures they do not fully understand and patients' 
expectations must be taken into consideration. 119 Another study conducted more recently 
focused on medical students’ perceptions of informed consent and found that most respondents 
felt ill-equipped and that their training in relation to informed consent had been ‘ineffective’.120 
Much of the undergraduate training around communication has been geared towards reaching 
an accurate and effective diagnosis in the shortest possible time.121 The authors of the study 
concluded that other aspects of the patient-doctor relationship, such as information disclosure, 
are thereby ‘inadvertently de-prioritised’. Most medical training is theoretical and students are 
not given sufficient practical opportunities to develop their skills to inform patients about 
treatment options and seek a valid and informed consent.122  
 
So, this reinforces the need for doctors to be given adequate opportunities for this type of 
practical on-the-job training, especially now that the informed consent process has become 
more time-consuming and complex. The RCS guidance does recognise that the decision 
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requires trainers to give consideration as to how this can be achieved within the newly defined 
legal parameters.123  
 
These messages from Montgomery clearly have implications for the content and delivery of 
medical education and training.  Informed consent is central to the doctor-patient relationship 
and must therefore be an integral and substantial part of medical training—not just in theory, 
but also in practice.  The GMC has recognised this and redesigned the medical foundation 
programme curriculum in 2016 to include a component on delivering patient centred care, 
maintaining trust through effective communication and seeking informed consent.124 
Moreover, it has been working with the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges to help 
faculties/colleges embed generic professional capabilities (ie human skills such as 
communication and team working) into all postgraduate curricula by 2017.125  
 
These changes are welcome steps in the right direction and will help the profession to move 
towards a workforce which embeds these key skills. However, they apply only to those 
clinicians who qualify in the UK. Recent statistics from the GMC reveal that approximately 
40% of doctors on the specialist register and 20% of doctors on the GP register gained their 
primary medical qualification outside the UK. It is not clear to what extent, if at all, medical 
education programmes overseas prioritise informed consent and communication skills in the 
same way as the GMC now does in the UK.126 A recent study has found that the prevalence of 
GMC performance assessments in the UK is significantly higher for those doctors who 
received their medical qualification outside the UK. 127  The data from the study highlights that 
doctors who trained in certain countries within and outside the European Economic Area 
perform worse than UK graduates. One possible explanation suggested by the authors of the 
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study is ‘in differences in the way doctors are trained in different countries’.128 This 
undoubtedly presents further challenges for effectively implementing the requirements of 
Montgomery across all sections of the workforce. And of course, these challenges are further 
compounded in the wake of Brexit. Data from the health and social care information centre 
suggests that 55,000 of the NHS’s 1.3 million workforce are EU nationals.129 The NHS is 
already struggling to recruit and retain permanent staff and, as the Health Committee has 
recently identified, there are likely to be further threats to the capacity of the medical workforce 
until the precise implications of Brexit to EU nationals living in the UK become known.130 
 
• A new approach to medical professionalism? 
 
So, what does this mean for the future of the medical profession and being a ‘good doctor’ 
today? Academics have already charted the demise of the dominance model and the erosion of 
professional autonomy in the medical profession.131 We have come a long way from Friedson’s 
model of an autonomous and self-regulating profession. Montgomery recognises that we have 
arrived at a new model of professionalism. 132  There is a clear signal from the Supreme Court 
judges that ‘an integral aspect of professionalism in treatment’ is ‘an approach based upon the 
informed involvement of patients in their treatment, rather than their being passive and 
potentially reluctant recipients’.133 The focus is now on the central role that patients should 
play in their care, treatment and recovery. Much of Oliver Quick’s recent work on patient safety 
argues for a new style of professionalism which allows space for patients to be involved.134 
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Similarly, a Royal College of Physicians Working Party report in 2005 advocated a new type 
of professionalism where the focus is shifted to partnerships and patients.135  
 
The focus on the interests of patients is clearly important, but this new model of 
professionalism must also acknowledge the interests of the profession and the hurdles it now 
faces working in the challenging NHS environment. A report by the Kings Fund has also called 
for a redefinition of professionalism, but one that also considers the changing context in which 
healthcare is delivered and recognises the pressures that doctors are now under on many fronts: 
from growing public demands and expectations (consumerism); increased managerial control 
(managerialism); new ways of (multi-agency) working and the changes to and growing 
pressures placed on doctors’ working conditions.136  
 
Current models of health care are complex and over-stretched and this does not always work 
best for patients or the aspirations of the workforce. Significantly, the Scottish Chief Medical 
Officer’s annual report for 2014/15 entitled ‘Realistic Medicine’137 has recognised that it may 
not possible to achieve a true model of shared decision making within the current conditions 
in the NHS. The report acknowledges that we need ‘a system and values change that 
rebalances decision-making power’138 and concludes that:   
‘....implementing shared decision-making in practice is problematic given the 
constraints of delivering healthcare. This may be particularly difficult in hospital 
settings where professionals and people may have little previous knowledge of each 
other. In part it needs to be addressed by pragmatic solutions that can dovetail into 
existing practice, but it also needs considerable organisational and whole systems 
change to support what is a fundamental shift in the relationship between people and 
professionals. At its core, it involves making those short and precious interactions that 
professionals and people have together, as productive as possible.’139  
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Her subsequent annual report on ‘Realising Realistic Medicine’ has reinforced the need to 
create the right conditions to realise this model of patient care.140 It is not just about changing 
professional attitudes, approaches and cultures, but it also involves having the right 
infrastructure, capability and capacity to do so.141 This is the crux of the issue. Broader systemic 
and cultural changes are key to ensuring that patients truly are at the heart of decision-making 
about their treatment.   A recent government review of progress since the Francis Inquiry has 
highlighted that the system is slowly moving towards a common, patient-centred and 
compassionate culture, but there is still much more work to be done.142  As part of that process, 
the GMC has begun to engage with what it means to be a good doctor and what professional 
capabilities are needed in the twenty first century. It held a series of events across the UK to 
discuss the challenges to professionalism that emerge in daily practice.143 The report was 
published in December 2016 and made several key recommendations. A key theme was the 
lack of time and support to make a reality of reflective practice and the need to provide a 
supportive culture, improve medical education and lifelong learning and work in partnership 
with patients. The profession is in a state of unease, however, the report make a number of 
recommendations to move forward relating to medical education and lifelong learning, 
promoting a supportive culture and partnerships with patients.144  Specifically, in the context 
of informed consent, the report recognises the need for clinicians to be better supported - 
medical education/ training should be more focused on meaningful patient involvement and 
the GMC must enhance the materials available to help doctors make decisions in partnership 
with patients. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The decision in Montgomery did not come as great surprise to many health care lawyers, and 
whilst it has ‘not created a new direction of travel for doctors’, it has certainly speeded up the 
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journey.145 It brings with it some unintended consequences for the medical profession and 
notions of what it means nowadays to be a ‘good’ doctor. As well as potentially adding to the 
unpredictability of litigation (a point acknowledged in the judgment itself) it will inevitably 
add to workload pressures, by requiring modifications to how doctors approach treatment 
decisions with patients and increasing the amount of time spent engaging with them.  
Professional guidance can help doctors to optimise the time they spend with patients, but it also 
recognises the challenges posed by this fact specific legal standard. This article has highlighted 
that the decision has undeniable consequences for certain areas of specialist medical practice 
and general practice in particular; the design and delivery of medical education/training and 
the scope for ‘on the job’ training/delegation.  These factors are relevant to questions about the 
core skills/attributes and values we expect from doctors and what being a good doctor should 
entail. Addressing these challenges is a matter for the relevant professional bodies and royal 
colleges.  
 
As noted above, some of the relevant bodies have responded to the judgment and already issued 
revised guidance encouraging surgeons and anaesthetists to modify their approaches.  This 
could improve the accuracy of preference diagnoses to the benefit of patients and practitioners, 
though research has demonstrated the need for doctors to be supported by robust information 
systems to do it properly.146 Moreover, whilst implementing a model of shared decision making 
to maximise patient preferences offers a range of potential benefits, there are also significant 
challenges to overcome, as the quote below demonstrates: 
‘Implementing shared decision making in routine health care offers considerable 
promise in terms of ethics, quality, informed decisions, patient satisfaction, enhanced 
ability for self-management, improved adherence, and meaningful outcomes. Putting 
these potentialities into everyday practice will be fraught with difficulties. Now is the 
time to address these barriers …..as the information explosion and personalized 
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medicine will require new educational structures, communication patterns, and 
decision-making forms’.147 
Montgomery sends out some key messages to doctors about what the legal system expects from 
medical professionals in the twenty first century. Good doctors must treat their patients with 
dignity and respect, take time to talk and get to know their individual needs and preferences, 
and work in partnership with patients. These expectations have been placed on the medical 
profession by the court with little thought to the context in which healthcare is delivered in the 
UK and the increasing pressures placed on doctors working in the NHS. Writing in 1985, Grubb 
and Schwartz148 highlighted how the conditions in the NHS would not provide a safe harbour 
for individualised choice.  The economics of the US healthcare system allows for consumer 
choice, whereas a publicly funded system, such as the NHS, could not tolerate patients with 
real authority to choose health care: 
‘The National Health Service cannot afford the caprices of individual patients who may 
choose medical care that leads to an improper allocation of the community's health care 
resources. The collective health of the nation cannot be held hostage by a few who wish 
more expensive treatment. There cannot be consumer sovereignty, and, thus, there 
cannot be as much respect for patient autonomy and the doctrine of informed consent, 
within a financially closed system’. 
The NHS may have opened-up to an internal market since that time and there is now far greater 
scope for competition, consumerism and patient choice. Nevertheless, available resources are 
still finite and the system still cannot afford it – the current financial pressures facing the NHS 
suggest that these words still ring true today. 
 
Despite these pressures, Lords Kerr and Reed opined that the approach taken in Montgomery: 
 
‘…may not be welcomed by some healthcare providers; but the reasoning of the House 
of Lords in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 was no doubt received in a similar 
way by the manufacturers of bottled drinks. The approach we have described has long 
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been operated in other jurisdictions, where healthcare practice presumably adjusted to 
its requirements’.149 (Emphasis supplied). 
 
It sounds like the time has come for clinicians working in the NHS to adjust to the same 
requirements, though quite how the system is going to afford to do that remains to be seen. The 
judgment is firmly rooted in principle and respects for patient rights, though by doing so it 
lacks a degree of realism and pragmatism. No matter how willing and well intentioned 
clinicians are to put patients first, some of these optimal ‘patient-focused’ standards are simply 
unattainable within the current constraints.  
 
Montgomery has set the bar high in terms of the legal standard required to advise patients about 
their options and give effect to patient preferences in their choice of treatment. Being a good 
doctor today is far more challenging than it ever has been. If Montgomery is to become a 
meaningful reality, medical students and clinicians at all levels and in all areas of practice must 
be supported and provided with the appropriate tools to enable them to strive to achieve this 
individualised patient-centred approach. Individualised patient care and choice is important, 
but we must also recognise the economic and other realities of the environment in which that 
care is now delivered and the accompanying challenges this entails. If the future of health care 
in the UK and the legal framework surrounding it are about working in partnership, that must 
mean recognising, respecting and valuing the interests of both partners in that relationship. 
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